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Today’s environment of increased operations tempo is stressing the KC-
135 Stratotanker fleet. With an 80-year life span expectancy, effectively 
maintaining these aircraft is challenging. This research modeled the KC-
135 programmed depot maintenance (PDM) flight controls repair cell to 
identify improvement opportunities within the repair process. Computational 
organizational modeling (COM) incorporates the human element along 
with organizational design theory. By employing COM to analyze the flight 
control repair cells, the authors examined design modifications applied to the 
baseline model and analyzed output variables, such as cycle time and project 
integration risk. The study concluded with presenting organizational design 
alternatives for decision makers to enhance the flight controls repair process.
the Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker’s principal mission is air refueling of Depart-ment of Defense (DoD) and allied nations’ aircraft. As a result of increased operations tempo, refueling and nontraditional taskings continue to stress the 
aging fleet. Furthermore, “the KC-135 fleet averages more than 46 years and is the 
oldest combat weapon system in the Air Force inventory” (Solis, Borseth, Cole-
man, Mardis, Thornton, et al., 2007, p. 1). With an 80-year life span expectancy, 
maintaining aging aircraft by the most cost-effective and efficient means is a difficult 
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challenge. This article presents the results of computational organizational modeling 
(COM) and simulation as an alternative methodology to complement the unit’s trans-
formation initiatives by deconstructing the flight controls repair process to identify 
efficient approaches to oversee process improvement at the repair cells.
The 564th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron (564 AMXS) is a unit assigned 
to the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center (OC-ALC) responsible for the U.S. 
Air Force (USAF) KC-135 aircraft’s PDM. Within the squadron, the KC-135 
flight controls repair cell (referred to as the Horizontal/Vertical [HV] Repair Cell 
throughout this article) is charged with refurbishing the aircraft’s vertical and two 
horizontal stabilizers.
The HV Repair Cell faces multiple complexities stemming from mission re-
quirements, financial pressures, workforce reductions, aircraft age, and continuous 
demands to eradicate waste. The OC-ALC senior leaders and KC-135 PDM manage-
ment expressed interest in additional approaches to improve PDM operations and 
invited the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to conduct this research. An analysis of 
the organization is used to assess the HV Repair Cell’s leverage of communication 
across its functions and information sharing between personnel.
Our research utilized POWer 3.0a software developed by the Virtual Design Team 
(VDT), led by Dr. Raymond E. Levitt and Dr. John C. Kunz at Stanford University. 
Our objective was to provide decision makers feasible alternatives regarding the KC-
135 HV Repair Cell’s organizational design. To meet this objective, we developed a 
computational organizational model of the flight controls repair operation to emulate 
the current maintenance process. Employing the model helped identify problem areas 
that might increase repair duration, integration risk, cost, and work backlog affecting 
decision bottlenecks. After developing the baseline model, we modified it to charac-
terize the implications of subsequent organizational design changes (what-if scenarios 
called interventions) on improving the repair process.
MethoD
scope
This research project only considered the organization, personnel, and pro-
cesses that accomplish flight controls maintenance. The report and modeling ef-
fort traced maintenance and administration tasks beginning when the HV Repair 
Cell receives the vertical and two horizontal stabilizers (after removal from the 
aircraft) and ending when the repair cell deems the stabilizers serviceable and 
ready for reinstallation on the aircraft. While the repair cell typically processes 
up to six sets of stabilizers at once, the model represents the repair of one set of 
stabilizers, based on information collected from unit personnel. Modeling and 
simulation of the flight controls repair operation was undertaken using unique 
POWer 3.0a software. This software was selected because it quantitatively models 
work processes, information and communication exchanges, human behavior, and 
organizational design.
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literature reVieW
In the 1980s, Dr. Levitt formed the VDT to investigate how to predict organiza-
tional behaviors using COM. The team based its computational organizational frame-
work on Jay R. Galbraith’s (1974; 1977) information-processing concepts. Their 
research uses COM to examine work processes and information flows associated with 
project- or task-based organizations (Nissen & Levitt, 2002).
COM enables decision makers to model and simulate prospective organiza-
tional design changes, evaluate modifications, calculate impact, and determine if 
potential benefits are worth the costs and risks. Moreover, it allows decision makers 
to identify and examine unintended consequences of organizational design changes 
before implementation. 
According to Kunz, Christiansen, Cohen, Jin, and Levitt (1998), Galbraith (1977) 
asserts that organizations possess limited abilities to process exceptions. Exceptions 
occur when local knowledge or authority is insufficient to deal with the information 
processing requirements, and personnel need advice or direction to accomplish their 
assigned tasks. The VDT incorporates Galbraith’s (1977) view regarding exceptions 
processing into the computational model. Through functional and project exception 
probabilities, the model simulates task and project failures and subsequent rework 
when organizational knowledge or authority is inadequate. The unique benefit of 
POWer software is that decision makers can preview potential organizational design 
changes and quantitatively project risk or rework levels prior to implementation, a 
feature that we use extensively in this study.
Employing the VDT model provides a valuable tool for managers to design 
organizations “the same way engineers design bridges: by building and analyzing 
computational models of planned organizations and the processes that they support” 
(Kunz, et al. 1998, p. 84). The VDT constructed a computational model that emulates 
real-world situations within the organization (Nissen & Levitt, 2002) and provides a 
capability to test through simulation and evaluate structural and task modifications. 
Thus, managers can identify how changes on interdependent activities can affect ef-
forts to avert cost overruns and quality failures (Levitt, 2004). Additionally, managers 
can identify unanticipated increase in coordination effort or rework occurring from 
overlapping and interdependent work tasks. According to Levitt and Kunz (2002, p. 
4), “this coordination and rework is hidden effort: it is not planned, tracked, managed, 
or even acknowledged except by the overworked staff.”
Employing the VDT model provides a valuable tool 
for managers to design organizations “the same way 
engineers design bridges: by building and analyzing 
computational models of planned organizations  
and the processes that they support.”
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Inputs entered in the VDT model transform qualitative attribute values into 
quantitative values. Depending on a unit’s activities and procedures, these inputs may 
consume time and generate certain communication requirements and exceptions. 
Exceptions occur when workers detect task errors requiring additional information 
or correction (rework). The VDT model assigns all positions a processing speed and 
the probability of identifying failure, indicating when a sub-activity within an overall 
activity fails.
The VDT framework is supported by Galbraith’s (1973; 1974) theory that orga-
nizations serve as exception-handling machines as part of his information processing 
view of organizations. Based on their conceptualization of Galbraith’s theory, the 
VDT’s “approach simulates the direct work and the hidden work, i.e., the coordina-
tion, supervision, rework, and waiting for all the actors in a project as they perform 
all of the project tasks” (Levitt & Kunz, 2002, p. 11).
input paraMeters to construct Baseline 
Applying information collected from HV Repair Cell personnel and observation 
of the flight control repair process, we developed a baseline model using the POWer 
3.0a software. The following parameters provided the foundation for the KC-135 HV 
Repair Cell model: (a) milestones, (b) tasks, (c) positions, and (d) meetings.
Milestones
Milestones identify the objective of the work performed and indicate the begin-
ning or ending of all work to complete the milestone’s objective. We also defined the 
tasks to accomplish each milestone. The repair process comprises four milestones: 
acceptance/disassembly, inspection, repair, and buildup (Figure 1).
figuRe 1:  hV rEPAIr CELL MoDEL’S Four MILEStoNES 
Acceptance/
Disassembly Inspection Repair Buildup
Horizontal Stabilizer Horizontal Stabilizer Horizontal Stabilizer Horizontal Stabilizer
Vertical Stabilizer Vertical Stabilizer Vertical Stabilizer Vertical Stabilizer
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Tasks
Tasks represent all the jobs that employees are responsible for completing. Dur-
ing the repair process, simultaneous production, scheduling, planning, and logistics 
operations occur. The HV Repair Cell model incorporates multiple tasks and sub-
tasks taking place throughout the flight controls repair process. Figure 2 illustrates the 
model’s four milestones indicating the tasks and responsible positions.
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Positions
Positions account for the personnel responsible for HV Repair Cell tasks. Within 
the model, eight positions execute repair and administrative tasks and characterize 
the hierarchy of information flow. Figure 3 depicts our representation of the repair 
cell positions and how they share information up, down, and across the informational 
hierarchy. While not a chain-of-command diagram, it shows the positions that execute 
repairs, accomplish administrative paperwork, and supervise subordinates’ efforts 
(i.e., flight controls repair tasks). The model also includes leadership positions signi-
fying decision-making personnel who regularly receive exception-handling questions 
on how to resolve errors from subordinates.
figuRe 3: hV rEPAIr CELL MoDEL’S PoSItIoNS  
AND INForMAtIoN hIErArChY
Meetings
Meetings represent important methods and times whereby personnel regularly, 
formally, and reliably transfer information about repair and administrative tasks and 
procedures. There are three meetings in the baseline model to coordinate daily asset 
schedules, conduct roll call, and share end-of-shift turnover information.
aDDitional input paraMeters to construct Baseline
Once the foundational parameters were established, we analyzed the organiza-
tion’s decision-making policies supporting the flight controls repair operation. These 
policies and procedures impact micro-decision-making behavior of HV Repair Cell 
workers and supervisory personnel.
Team experience defines the extent to which organizational members 
previously and successfully worked together to accomplish the project. The set 
value determines how quickly or slowly positions process information.
Centralization characterizes whether decisions are made by senior-level 
positions or decentralized to lower-level (subordinate), responsible positions. 

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The set value impacts project duration, waiting time, position backlog, and 
project integration risk.
Formalization defines whether communication within the organization tends 
to occur formally in meetings, informally between position members, or 
evenly between formal and informal methods.
Matrix strength describes the “connectedness” of the organization.  
This setting illustrates the use of informal and formal information 
exchanges, perceived need to attend meetings, and percentage of formal 
meetings attended.
Communication probability measures the level of communication required 
between tasks that are interdependent.
Noise probability measures the probability of interruptions that take time 
away from position members conducting direct flight controls repair tasks in 
an ordinary working day.
Rework links represent where rework occurs resulting from and related to 
identified tasks.
Functional exception probability defines the probability that repair tasks fail 
due to localized task errors and require rework by the position responsible 
for the errors. Errors may be detected through self-check procedures, after 
completion of work by position peers, or supervisor’s review. When the model 
generates a functional exception, the position responsible for correcting 
the error either reworks, quickly fixes, or ignores it based on the model’s 
functional exception probability setting.
Project exception probability defines the probability that repair tasks 
fail and generate rework for all dependent tasks. If applicable to the 
organization, these tasks are connected by rework links in the model. The 
responsible position reworks, quickly fixes, or ignores the error when the 
model generates a project exception.
Communication links represent task completion and integration 
dependency. If two tasks require personnel to talk and share information, 
a communication link is incorporated into the model between those two 
interdependent tasks. Communication links inform the model these tasks 
depend on each other for information.
Knowledge links represent relationships and information sharing between 
coworkers. Coworkers provide information to other employees about task 
requirements by sharing their skills and experiences. Without knowledge 
sharing, workers may make decisions concerning task completion that 
compromise overall task and/or repair quality. By sharing information and 
communicating within the information hierarchy, employees mitigate the 
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Baseline Model
The computational organizational model of the flight controls repair operation 
emulates the HV Repair Cell’s current process and operations. Figure 4 depicts a 
POWer 3.0a screenshot of the HV Repair Cell baseline model. Within the screenshot, 
lines correspond to knowledge transfer, information sharing, task interdependencies, 
and process flow. The three parallelograms at the top of the image represent meet-
ings, the eight people objects illustrate positions, the rectangles below the positions 
represent core touch tasks, the hexagons portray completion milestones, and the long 
rectangles to the upper right represent non-touch tasks. 
In the model, positions connect to assigned tasks using task-assignment arrows. 
Arrows connecting positions to positions from the head denote supervisory roles, 
while arrows connecting positions to positions from the feet represent knowledge 
links. Arrows connecting positions to meetings symbolize required meeting atten-
dance. Sets of arrows between tasks signify interdependencies, rework links, and com-
munication links. Finally, arrows link each task (rectangle) and milestone (hexagon), 
starting from the HV Repair Start (top left), and ending with the HV Repair Finish 
(mid right). These show sequential and parallel tasks within the process flow path.
The validity of the baseline model’s output was critical to accurately gauge the 
effects of the applied interventions. Hence, we performed sensitivity analysis to 
verify the baseline model’s validity. The communication probability parameter was 
selected to assess its impact to the HV Repair Cell model. The baseline’s duration 
of 34.32 days provides the closest approximate result—within 1.9 percent of the 
historical average repair of 35 workdays. We changed the communication probabil-
ity setting from 0.20 to 0.10 or 0.30, which reduced duration by 0.10 percent and 
0.19 percent from the baseline’s prediction, to 34.29 and 34.26 days respectively. 
Thus, the baseline model with a 0.20 communication probability setting most 
accurately emulates the actual repair process, showing that the model is robust to 
reasonable changes in this parameter. The flight controls repair duration predicted 
by this model sufficiently reflects the observed duration of 35 workdays. The ac-
curacy of the baseline model improves the probability that simulations will predict 
realistic outputs. Therefore, this model was used to forecast performance outputs, 
such as expected repair duration, direct and indirect work, waiting time, project 
cost and risk, and exception-handling.
Interventions
Once the baseline model accurately depicted current flight controls repair opera-
tions, we examined eight output parameters from the model’s simulation results. The 
parameters included project duration, direct work time, indirect work time (measured 
by rework time, coordination time, exception-handling wait time), total direct and 
indirect work time, total project cost, total functional and project exception time 
(measured by functional exception work and project exception work), project risk, 
and position backlog. After this assessment, we identified seven organizational design 
interventions to simulate and compare against the baseline model.
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Intervention 1 added a sheet metal mechanic to the current pool of 14 sheet 
metal mechanics. This intervention provided insight into how much repair 
duration could be reduced by increasing this resource.
Intervention 2 combined the AM2 and AM7 positions to create one AM9 
position with nine aircraft mechanics responsible for all aircraft mechanic 
tasks. The intervention was projected to show the impact of knowledge-
sharing and enhanced training on low-skill-level AM2 personnel. These 
improvements were expected to reduce project duration and decrease rework 
time. Because of learning curve effects, the model predicted the need for 
increased coordination time and exception-handling wait time as AM2 
members learned new tasks and asked more questions.
Intervention 3 changed the level of centralization (decision-making and 
exception-handling responsibilities) from medium to low, changing the 
organization’s decision-making practices to a decentralized operation. The 
results of this intervention were expected to decrease overall repair time, 
rework, coordination, and exception-handling wait time. Yet, low levels 
of centralization were also predicted to increase project integration risk as 
lower-level repair cell employees sought less information from higher-level 
decision makers.
Intervention 4 increased the functional exception probability parameter 
value from 5 percent to 10 percent. This intervention evaluated the effects 
of added stress if the repair process became less standardized and caused 
more exceptions. This intended to mimic the experience with recent KC-
135 stabilizers (undergoing PDM) assigned to units in highly corrosive 
environments that recently displayed more severe corrosion damage. This 
damage affected repair diagnosis and repair time by causing more exceptions 
or task errors. Mechanics and administrators made more exception-handling 
inquiries to the team leader on how to proceed. Thus, to model additional 
stress on the system, the functional exception probability parameter value 
was raised from 5 percent to 10 percent. Overall project duration, cost, and 
integration risk were predicted to increase as employees learned new operating 
procedures. As strain on the flight controls system intensified, the amount of 
exceptions was expected to escalate.
Intervention 5 combined Intervention 2 (create AM9 position) and 
Intervention 3 (change centralization to low). After evaluating the first four 
interventions’ simulation results, we developed a combined intervention 
to assess potential synergistic effects. This intervention revealed whether 
beneficial interventions executed in isolation result in the same, incremental, 
or continued improvement when integrated.
Intervention 6 cross-trained and combined all aircraft and sheet metal 
mechanics to create one Mechanic Pool position. Current OC-ALC hiring 
and operating regulations prohibit employees from formal cross-training. 
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was renegotiated to allow formal cross-training. The workers assigned to 
the mechanic pool would require training and certification to complete 
disassembly, inspection, repair, and buildup tasks. Cross-training was 
expected to increase learning, knowledge sharing, and skill levels for 
all mechanics. Additionally, this intervention was anticipated to make 
accomplishing disassembly, inspection, repair, and buildup more efficient, 
since only one position (instead of three) would be responsible for these 
tasks. As one position becomes accountable for all mechanic tasks, repair 
duration, cost, integration risk, and indirect work time were predicted to 
decrease. With 23 mechanics working jointly to complete tasks, the amount 
of exceptions generated by the model was expected to grow, but also be 
handled more quickly.
Intervention 7 changed the following parameters to analyze the expected 
outcome if three unit personnel retired within the next two fiscal years: team 
experience, communication probability, project exception probability, and 
functional exception probability. In 2007, the 76th Maintenance Wing offered 
voluntary retirement incentives (under the federal government’s Voluntary 
Separation Incentive Pay program) to retirement-eligible personnel as part 
of reshaping efforts to match the workforce with workload requirements 
(Daniel, 2007). According to the HV Repair Cell’s shop supervisor, two sheet 
metal mechanics and one aircraft mechanic were eligible to retire between 
September 30, 2007, and September 30, 2009. This intervention simulated and 
identified the effect on the unit if another retirement incentive program was 
offered and the three members retired.
Previewing potential organizational changes and subsequent consequences before 
expending resources offers valuable and cost-effective advantages. Simulating inter-
ventions on the baseline model allows quantifying these impacts. Furthermore, the 
model provides decision makers with quantitative evidence for enacting prospective 
HV Repair Cell design modifications.
results
Table 1 shows eight output parameters evaluated during this research: 
simulated project duration; 
direct work time; 
indirect (or hidden) work time measured by rework time, coordination time, 
exception-handling wait time; 
total direct and indirect work time; 
total project cost; 
total functional and project exception time measured by functional exception 
work and project exception work; 











Defense Acquisition Review Journal the future of integrateD supply chain ManageMent
39
eMploying orga iZational MoDeling anD siMulation
table 1: SAMPLE outPut PArAMEtErS,  
hV rEPAIr CELL BASELINE MoDEL
siMulateD proJect Duration
Simulated project duration is the amount of time, on average, the entire HV 
Repair Cell process takes to complete, including all maintenance and administrative 
tasks for one set of horizontal and vertical stabilizers.
Direct WorK tiMe
Direct work time measures the amount of time positions consume as they per-
form tasks before handling any exceptions generated by the model..
total inDirect or hiDDen WorK tiMe
Total indirect or hidden work time incorporates rework time, coordination time, 
and exception-handling wait time.
Rework time is the time all positions need during the flight controls repair 
process to carry out rework. This time measures the impact if a driver task 
fails, causing rework time for all dependent tasks linked to the driver task by 





Simulated Project Duration (days) 34.32
Direct Work Time (days) 130.52
Indirect (Hidden) Work Time (days):
Rework Time (days)
Coordination Time (days)





Total Direct and Indirect (Hidden) Time (days) 161.38
Total Project Cost ($) $60,627.98
Total Functional and Project Exception Time (days)
Functional Exception Work (days)
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Coordination time is the amount of time positions spend attending meetings 
and processing information requests from other positions.
Exception-handling wait time measures the time positions consume waiting 
for a supervisor’s response about how to resolve functional or project 
exceptions generated by the model. If the supervisor is managing other tasks 
or positions and becomes overly backlogged, personnel may decide to ignore 
or quickly fix the error and cause project risk to escalate.
total Direct anD inDirect WorK tiMe
Total direct and indirect work time is the sum of direct work time plus all indirect 
work time.
total proJect cost
Total project cost is the sum of direct work, rework, coordination, and exception-
handling wait costs. These costs were based on POWer’s default fixed cost settings 
for the salary of each position ($50 per hour) and each task ($0). Although the true 
cost of conducting tasks and employing positions was not modeled for this research, 
the default settings enabled us to monitor relative changes in total project cost for 
each intervention compared to the baseline model.
total functional anD proJect exception tiMe
Total functional and project exception time represents the sum of the time posi-
tions take to complete work on exceptions (rework).
Functional exception time signifies the amount of time positions consume 
repairing specific tasks that fail and require rework.
Project exception time records the time that positions take repairing failed 
tasks and dependent tasks (attached in the model by rework links). 
proJect risK 
Project risk represents the probability repaired stabilizer components are not 
integrated at the end of the repair process because they have defects following rework 
and exception-handling.
position BacKlog
Position backlog depicts the number of days of direct and indirect work a posi-
tion has yet to accomplish. The position with the largest backlog and the correspond-
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Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results of the seven interventions applied to the 
baseline model. Moreover, Table 2 shows a relevance legend to help evaluate the 
changes in each intervention.
table 2: output Value Levels of relevance
































































34.32 33.90 34.21 33.46 34.15 34.98 33.51 29.42 35.03
Direct Work Time 
(days)












































Total Direct and 
Indirect (Hidden) 
Time (days)
161.38 161.95 161.14 159.12 160.35 173.88 157.93 152.01 177.81
Total Project Cost ($) $60,627.98 $60,841.87 $64,767.71 $56,739.93 $60,224.56 $65,543.84 $56,280.97 $60,453.35 $67,813.97


































Project Risk 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.12
Position Backlog 
(days)


































Value (X) Level of Relevance
X < 1% No Relevant Difference
1% # X < 5% Weakly Relevant Difference
5% # X < 10% Relevant Difference
X > 10% Highly Relevant Difference
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table 4: outPut PArAMEtErS,  
PErCENtAGE ChANGE FroM BASELINE MoDEL
Discussion
recoMMenDations
The simulation results of the seven interventions performed in this research pro-
vide OC-ALC leaders an analysis of quantitative and qualitative information. Table 5 
summarizes the output parameters of the baseline model next to the best, second-best, 

































































34.32 -1.22% -0.34% -2.52% -0.49% 1.92% -2.37% -14.28% 2.06%
Direct Work Time 130.52 NO 
CHANGE
















































Total Direct and Indi-
rect (Hidden) Time
161.38 0.36% -0.15% -1.40% -0.64% 7.75% -2.14% -5.80% 10.18%
Total Project Cost $60,627.98 0.35% 6.83% -6.41% -0.67% 8.11% -7.17% -0.29% 11.85%


































Project Risk 0.07 16.48% 32.11% 40.43% 20.51% 17.52% 36.49% -18.68% 81.10%
Position Backlog
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table 5: outPut PArAMEtErS oF BASELINE  
AND toP rANKED INtErVENtIoNS
As a result of this research, the following recommendations were provided to 
OC-ALC leaders:
Address current hiring and operating regulations to pursue the allowance of 
formal cross-training within the HV Repair Cell.
Continue with voluntary informal cross-training of aircraft and sheet metal 
mechanics within the HV Repair Cell. Expand the number of cross-training 
tasks as time and effort permit.
Train and fully qualify all nine aircraft mechanics in disassembly, repair linkages, 































1, 3, 4, 7
130.52
Indirect (Hidden) Work Time (days):
Rework Time (days)
Coordination Time (days)
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Functional Exception Work (days)
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Identify clear expectations and develop an HV Repair Cell Transition Plan to 
prepare the organization as multiple employees become retirement-eligible.
The output from Intervention 6 strongly supported cross-training within the HV 
Repair Cell. We recommended that OC-ALC leaders pursue changing the current hir-
ing and operating regulations to permit formal cross-training. In the interim, we sug-
gested the production supervisor and team leader continue with voluntary informal 
cross-training of aircraft and sheet metal mechanics. The results from Intervention 6 
might prove useful to objectively portray that potential benefits outweigh the cost of 
cross-training HV Repair Cell mechanics—including highly relevant time, rework, 
exception-handling, risk, and position backlog improvements.
Employment of Intervention 5 characteristics entails a certain amount of training 
effort to teach the aircraft mechanics new tasks and time to decentralize decision-
making authority within the organization. Therefore, we urged the HV Repair Cell 
to begin to fully qualify and utilize all aircraft mechanics as soon as possible. The 
findings suggested the unit would benefit from training the two aircraft mechanics 
currently dedicated to repairing linkages on disassembly and buildup tasks. Since this 
organizational change requires adequate planning, it should not occur too quickly. As 
low-skill-level mechanics become medium-skilled and more highly skilled, the HV 
Repair Cell should complete repairs more efficiently and rapidly.
Additionally, decision makers would require restraint and trust to control how to 
decentralize decision-making authority. Lower levels of centralization might be real-
ized by three initiatives: 
management taking time to clearly explain expectations and exceptions-to-
the-rule if an emergency arises, 
supervisors believing in subordinates’ skill levels and exception-handling 
abilities, and 
leadership preparing mechanics sufficiently to make good decisions, ensuring 
flight controls repair quality does not suffer.
The results of Intervention 7 (three eligible mechanics retire) underscored the 
complications organizations face as multiple employees become retirement-eligible. 
Before moving workers between divisions or organizations, leaders should consider 
the resulting percent of retirement-eligible personnel the moves create. Considering 
the findings from Intervention 7 should help decision makers explain the expected 
impact of workforce reshaping efforts and help mitigate undesirable consequences. 
As the number of retirement-eligible federal civilian employees increases, dealing 
with this type of organizational design decision will become both more difficult and 
more important for the DoD.
Prior to implementing any of the preceding recommendations, we advised OC-
ALC decision makers to review planned and ongoing process-improvement initiatives 
affecting horizontal and vertical stabilizer repair and to identify similarities to the 
interventions performed during this study.
Understanding the enormous influence communication, information processing 
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KC-135 aircraft’s PDM and mission success. Effective knowledge and information 
transfer between personnel directly impacts PDM timeliness, cost, integration risk, 
and quality. Therefore, we recommend that other organizations, faced with complex 
processes depending on various levels of communication and skill levels, should 
consider the computerized organizational modeling approach to analyze and improve 
their processes. In particular, remanufacturing and repair facilities with 6–10 posi-
tions, 3–5 milestones, and 35–50 tasks would be great candidates for process analysis 
and improvement using this method. For example, should the facility remanufacture 
complex assets, such as complete aircraft or armored cars, the analyst should partition 
the analysis into easily identifiable teams operating in one or more modules of the 
whole, rather than trying to analyze the complete process at once. While the approach 
helps comprehend the process and untangle some of its complexity, one can obtain 
better results if part of the complexity is reduced by judicious partition of the com-
plete operation prior to initiating the analysis.
conclusions
Computational organizational modeling and simulation results generated by this 
research increased flight controls repair visibility and supplied an objective awareness 
for KC-135 PDM decision makers. The more transparency and utility provided, the 
more apt decision makers will be to examine potential organizational design modifi-
cations and assess the inherent trade-offs prior to executing changes.
The baseline model constructed for this study may be used by OC-ALC leaders 
and decision makers as a starting point to provide quantitative and qualitative results 
of future HV Repair Cell design initiatives. Furthermore, the COM results may vali-
date organizational design adjustments leaders already believe might improve the HV 
Repair Cell, but are not thoroughly convinced or prepared to implement.
By simulating multiple interventions for comparison against the current flight 
controls repair process (depicted by the baseline), this study facilitated the HV Repair 
Cell’s efforts to manage repair integration risk and conserve limited time and resourc-
es. Before implementing any design interventions shown to mitigate risk or decrease 
throughput time, HV Repair Cell leaders should also consider implementation and 
opportunity costs. Decision makers should weigh the trade-offs between time saved, 
stabilizer repair quality (project integration risk), and investment cost.
Cost benefit and risk analysis are essential to designing optimal organizational 
layouts. Military leaders must consider the relationship between organizational per-
formance improvements (e.g., reduced repair turnaround time) and risk factors. The 
DoD emphasizes warfighter safety by managing risk. Repaired stabilizers installed on 
the KC-135 must perform in accordance with design characteristics, environmental 
conditions, operating constraints, and aircrew expectations. Otherwise, poor quality 
could prove fatal in combat or training environments.
In conclusion, the more visualization and transparency provided to decision 
makers before executing potential organizational design modifications, the better 
prepared they are to make those decisions. We aim to provide value by highlighting 
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and presenting the importance of COM because it uniquely incorporates the human 
element through an objective method. We hope that future efforts will employ this 
innovative type of modeling approach to enhance decision making and complement 
other DoD transformation initiatives, such as U.S. Air Force Smart Operations for the 
21st Century, Lean Six Sigma, and the U.S. Navy’s AIRSpeed program.
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